A military justice bestiary

Judge Cox was certainly the master of the animal metaphor. But he's hardly the only military appellate judge to employ beasts -- real or imagined -- to vividly make a point.

Here are a few of my favorites. I'll set out the beast, followed by its definition, and then -- in OED fashion -- the first known military justice use of the term or concept. If you have other good examples, please post them.

800-pound gorilla: a very powerful beast with superhuman (or superjudicial) power to protect a convicted servicemember. "Moreover, Courts of Military Review are something like the proverbial 800-pound gorilla when it comes to their ability to protect an accused." United States v. Parker, 36 M.J. 269, 271 (C.M.A. 1993) (majority opinion by Judge Cox).

Duck: a web-footed swimming bird of the family Anatidae characterized by a flat bill, short legs, and instinctive attraction to the water that displays a penchant to smuggle civilian legal terms and principles into the military justice system. "Many [military lawyers] have certainly taken to so-called 'civilianization' of the United States military justice system like ducks to water." United States v. Jones, 7 M.J. 806, 808 (N.C.M.R. 1979) (majority opinion by Senior Judge Dunbar).

Elephant-trunked camel: 1. a large humped ruminant quadruped of the genus camelius whose hump sports the long, flexible cylindrical nasal appendage of an elephant. 2. an evolutionary mistake. 3. the mixing of civilian with military law. "To apply civilian concepts of pendency of appeal within the statutorily constructed scheme of the UCMJ is to graft the elephant's nose to the camel's hump." United States v. Roettger, 16 M.J. 536, 545 (A.C.M.R. 1983) (Judge Coker, dissenting).

Hound dog rule: an inclination to exercise a peremptory challenge because a court-martial member just doesn't smell right. "The only thing that bothers me about this is that I don't know what impact it will have on the 'Hound Dog Rule.'" United States v. Santiago-Davila, 26 M.J. 380, 393 n* (C.M.A. 1988) (Cox, J., concurring).

Kangaroo court: that which a court-martial is not. "This was no 'kangaroo court.'" United States v. Davis, 46 M.J. 551 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1997) (majority opinion by Judge Oliver).

Orangutan: an arboreal long-haired anthropoid ape that would be unlikely to satisfy the Article 25 criteria for court-martial members. "No doubt there are limits to waiver; if the parties stipulated to trial by 12 orangutans the defendant's conviction would be invalid notwithstanding his consent, because some minimum of civilized procedure is required by community feeling regardless of what the defendant wants or is willing to accept." United States v. Weasler, 43 M.J. 15, 18 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (majority opinion by Judge Crawford) (quoting United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203 (1995) (majority opinion by Justice Thomas) (quoting United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985) (majority opinion by Judge Posner))).

Pink elephant: a large five-toed pachyderm of a markedly non-standard color that, while fictitious, is still difficult to ignore. "Unfortunately, it may well be that such an instruction is akin to one to ignore the pink elephant that just walked across the courtroom." United States v. Welker, 44 M.J. 85, 92 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (Senior Judge Everett, dissenting).

Skunk: a small North American mammal of the weasel family that produces a malodorous scent when struck by an automobile. "These cases are very similar to running over a skunk while driving your car. You might not ever see the beast, but you certainly can smell it." United States v. Wales, 31 M.J. 301, 311 (C.M.A. 1990) (Judge Cox dissenting in part and concurring in the result).