Stopping (or at least slowing) the revolving door

In United States v. Rhoades, __ M.J. ___, No. 07-0173/AR (C.A.A.F. Jan. 9, 2008), CAAF unanimously holds that the military judge did not abuse his discretion by precluding the former Chief of Military Justice at Fort Huachuca (gesundheit) from serving as civilian defense counsel in a case that arose during the waning days of his active duty service.

Chief Judge Effron's opinion for the court sets out a helpful overview of legal restrictions on post-government employment. The opinion also observes that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice isn't absolute, but may be outweighed by the "need for fair, efficient, and orderly administration of justice." Rhoades, slip op. at 4 (quoting United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007)). So "disqualification of a defendant's chosen counsel due to a 'previous or ongoing relationship with an opposing party, even when the opposing party is the Government,' does not violate the Sixth Amendment." Id. (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)).

CAAF concludes "that a record that demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that counsel's representation would violate a statutory post-employment restriction designed to protect the integrity of trial proceedings is sufficient to show 'a serious potential for conflict' that may overcome the presumption in favor of the accused's counsel of choice" and that the military judge "has discretion to disqualify counsel." Id. (quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164).