Here's a link to Professor Yung's commentary on the Louisiana's supplemental brief in support of rehearing in Kennedy v. Louisiana. He's critical the brief, which we discussed favorably here.
And here's a link to Professor Berman's predicted outcome: the Supremes will issue "an amended opinion that adds discussion of military law, but does not change the sum or substance of the Kennedy ruling."
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Thursday, September 25, 2008
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Ali CAAF Writ Appeal Add'l Thoughts -- Redux
On the occasion of the first civilian UCMJ case to come before CAAF, I must mention the timing of the writ appeal petition in Ali v. Austin (which, I will admit, was not on my mind until JO'C mentioned it) .
The writ appeal, which attempts to invoke CAAF's All Writs Act jurisdiction over a case that is pending Art. 69 review, comes while the Denedo cert. petition by the U.S. Solicitor General makes its way to SCOTUS for a fall conference---see our prior coverage here, here, and here. As our loyal readers both know, the question presented in Denedo is essentially whether CAAF has the power to review a writ, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, filed by a former service member after his court-martial has become final. In Denedo, there is no UCMJ provision addressing the power that CAAF asserted. Rather, in Denedo, CAAF premised its assertion of jurisdiction on the All Writs Act.
CAAF, in a 3-2 decision in United States v. Lopez de Victoria, 66 M.J. 67 (C.A.A.F. 2008), recently held that the government could take an interlocutory appeal to CAAF when the the Gov't lost at CCA. In Lopez de Victoria, the statute at issue (Art. 62, UCMJ) addressed only CCA jurisdiction and was silent on CAAF jurisdiction.
Both CAAF decisions, Denedo and Lopez de Victoria, have been criticized by the Solicitor General for their expansion of CAAF jurisdiction, as we noted here, though only Denedo is before SCOTUS on petition for certiorari.
The argument for CAAF jurisdiction in Ali, it could be argued, is even weaker than the argument for CAAF jurisdiction in Denedo and Lopez de Victoria. At least in Lopez de Victoria the statute (Art. 62, UCMJ) expressly mentioned CCA's authority to review a government appeal. In Denedo the fact that no statute addressed the particular power CAAF was asserting added some credibility to the All Writs Act argument. However, in Ali, the statute at issue (Art. 69, UCMJ), in fact, expressly states that CCA and CAAF do not have jurisdiction over a case that has resulted in a sub-jurisdictional sentence (i.e. less than one year of confinement awarded in Mr. Ali's case). Of course, the argument could also be made that the case for jurisdiction is the same as in Denedo because no statute specifically addresses the type of appeal at issue in Ali, a writ of habeas corpus seeking limited review of jurisdictional issues in the case.
My point in all of this is not to vote for or against CAAF jurisdiction in Ali, but, rather, seeing as how the Ali brief only devoted a page (in Courier-12 font) to the jurisdictional issue, I wonder if CAAF will order supplemental briefing to address this issue and the Golden CAAF in the room, Clinton v. Goldsmith? And what about the legislative history of the 1989 changes to Art. 69, does it suggest military appellate court intervention in the process? Ali's brief cited McPhail, a 1976 CMA case that held CMA had jurisdiction over sub-jurisdictional cases under the All Writs Act. ACCA has more recently addressed the Art. 69 writ issue in Dew v. United States, 48 M.J. 639 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998), but did not address the legislative history. The legislative history of the 1989 amendments to Art. 69, UCMJ seem to be more in line with Clinton v. Goldsmith than McPhail. See Dukes v. Smith, 34 M.J. 803 (N.M.C.M.R. 1991) (noting congressional concern over extension of jurisdiction under the All Writs Act in cases like McPhail). How does the logic from Dew and McPhail fare post-Clinton v. Goldsmith? How do any of these cases fare post-Denedo if SCOTUS grants cert.? All issues worth a few more paragraphs.
As far as substantive issues, I throw this out to our readers: could CAAF, if they address the merits of Ali's first argument, resolve the case on narrow factual grounds? The opinion might look something like: (1) we accept Col. Winthrop's position that a civilian cannot constitutionally be made subject to UCMJ jurisdiction in time of peace (a position nominally supported by Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) and Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 264 (1960)); (2) however, wars of today are not black and white; there is war, there is peace, and there is a whole lot in between that sure seems like war; but (3) where ever that line may fall between war and peace, what was going on in Iraq at the time of Mr. Ali's detention and court-martial was not war.
Just thoughts. Talk amongst yourselves.
The writ appeal, which attempts to invoke CAAF's All Writs Act jurisdiction over a case that is pending Art. 69 review, comes while the Denedo cert. petition by the U.S. Solicitor General makes its way to SCOTUS for a fall conference---see our prior coverage here, here, and here. As our loyal readers both know, the question presented in Denedo is essentially whether CAAF has the power to review a writ, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, filed by a former service member after his court-martial has become final. In Denedo, there is no UCMJ provision addressing the power that CAAF asserted. Rather, in Denedo, CAAF premised its assertion of jurisdiction on the All Writs Act.
CAAF, in a 3-2 decision in United States v. Lopez de Victoria, 66 M.J. 67 (C.A.A.F. 2008), recently held that the government could take an interlocutory appeal to CAAF when the the Gov't lost at CCA. In Lopez de Victoria, the statute at issue (Art. 62, UCMJ) addressed only CCA jurisdiction and was silent on CAAF jurisdiction.
Both CAAF decisions, Denedo and Lopez de Victoria, have been criticized by the Solicitor General for their expansion of CAAF jurisdiction, as we noted here, though only Denedo is before SCOTUS on petition for certiorari.
The argument for CAAF jurisdiction in Ali, it could be argued, is even weaker than the argument for CAAF jurisdiction in Denedo and Lopez de Victoria. At least in Lopez de Victoria the statute (Art. 62, UCMJ) expressly mentioned CCA's authority to review a government appeal. In Denedo the fact that no statute addressed the particular power CAAF was asserting added some credibility to the All Writs Act argument. However, in Ali, the statute at issue (Art. 69, UCMJ), in fact, expressly states that CCA and CAAF do not have jurisdiction over a case that has resulted in a sub-jurisdictional sentence (i.e. less than one year of confinement awarded in Mr. Ali's case). Of course, the argument could also be made that the case for jurisdiction is the same as in Denedo because no statute specifically addresses the type of appeal at issue in Ali, a writ of habeas corpus seeking limited review of jurisdictional issues in the case.
My point in all of this is not to vote for or against CAAF jurisdiction in Ali, but, rather, seeing as how the Ali brief only devoted a page (in Courier-12 font) to the jurisdictional issue, I wonder if CAAF will order supplemental briefing to address this issue and the Golden CAAF in the room, Clinton v. Goldsmith? And what about the legislative history of the 1989 changes to Art. 69, does it suggest military appellate court intervention in the process? Ali's brief cited McPhail, a 1976 CMA case that held CMA had jurisdiction over sub-jurisdictional cases under the All Writs Act. ACCA has more recently addressed the Art. 69 writ issue in Dew v. United States, 48 M.J. 639 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998), but did not address the legislative history. The legislative history of the 1989 amendments to Art. 69, UCMJ seem to be more in line with Clinton v. Goldsmith than McPhail. See Dukes v. Smith, 34 M.J. 803 (N.M.C.M.R. 1991) (noting congressional concern over extension of jurisdiction under the All Writs Act in cases like McPhail). How does the logic from Dew and McPhail fare post-Clinton v. Goldsmith? How do any of these cases fare post-Denedo if SCOTUS grants cert.? All issues worth a few more paragraphs.
As far as substantive issues, I throw this out to our readers: could CAAF, if they address the merits of Ali's first argument, resolve the case on narrow factual grounds? The opinion might look something like: (1) we accept Col. Winthrop's position that a civilian cannot constitutionally be made subject to UCMJ jurisdiction in time of peace (a position nominally supported by Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) and Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 264 (1960)); (2) however, wars of today are not black and white; there is war, there is peace, and there is a whole lot in between that sure seems like war; but (3) where ever that line may fall between war and peace, what was going on in Iraq at the time of Mr. Ali's detention and court-martial was not war.
Just thoughts. Talk amongst yourselves.
House bill to expand SCOTUS jurisdiction over military justice cases picks up two new co-sponsors
H.R. 3174 picked up two new co-sponsors yesterday: Rep. Lynn Woolsey from California and Rep. Madeleine Bordallo from Guam. That brings the number of co-sponsors to 15.
"Military law is American law"
The state of Louisiana filed its reply in support of its rehearing petition in Kennedy v. Louisiana today. Here's a SCOTUSblog piece discussing it and here is SCOTUSblog's link to the brief itself.
As the quotation from the brief in the title of this post indicates, Louisiana argues that it is appropriate to consider military justice legislation when conducting jurisdictional nose counting. Louisiana's Supplemental Brief at 2. Even more, since Congress enacts military justice legislation, such statutes count as Cyrano de Bergerac-quality noses. See id. at 2-3 ("This Court has never found a 'national consensus' against capital punishment for a particular offense . . . when Congress, consisting of Representatives from all 50 States, has affirmatively authorized such punishment.") (quoting Acting SG's brief at 4).
Beyond this and other statements of respect for the military justice system, the brief engages in nuanced discussion of military law reflecting great familiarity with the system. In one passage sure to warm any military litigator's heart, Louisiana reminds the Supremes that their predecessors on the bench relied in part on the UCMJ when deciding Miranda. Id. at 7. The brief also knowledgeably discusses CMA and CMR decisions dealing with Coker's effect on the military justice system, id. at 17, and calls out Petitioner's counsel for ignoring a 1989 military capital prosecution for rape, id. at 14-15.
The brief's most devastating point is delivered even deeper in the weeds. Petitioner's brief opposing rehearing argued that neither of the DOD reports that led to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006's Article 120 amendments "mentions the penalty for child (or adult) rape in its executive summary." Petitioner's Brief at 9-10. But if one actually reads past the executive summary, Louisiana's brief points out, the Joint Service Committee's report on sex crimes and the UCMJ includes a discussion about Coker and its effect on capital punishment for rape generally and for child rape specifically. Louisiana's Supplemental Brief at 12 (citing JSC Report at 74-75). As a matter of advocacy, that point must have been particularly delicious for Louisiana's counsel, since Petitioner's counsel had lit them up for allegedly overplaying the Joint Service Committee report's treatment of the Louisiana statute authorizing capital punishment for child rape. Petitioner's Brief at 10. Yet, as Louisiana's counsel retort, page 75 of the JSC report expressly discussed the 1995 amendment to Louisiana law that allowed capital punishment for child rape. Louisiana's Supplemental Brief at 12.
What happens next? As the greatest blog on Earth (SCOTUSblog) reports: "The Justices are scheduled to consider the rehearing petition at their private Conference on Monday. If rehearing is granted, word of that may become known as early as next Tuesday. A denial might not become known until Monday, Oct. 6, at the formal opening of the new Term." We will, of course, be on the lookout for developments and post a link when more news is available.
As the quotation from the brief in the title of this post indicates, Louisiana argues that it is appropriate to consider military justice legislation when conducting jurisdictional nose counting. Louisiana's Supplemental Brief at 2. Even more, since Congress enacts military justice legislation, such statutes count as Cyrano de Bergerac-quality noses. See id. at 2-3 ("This Court has never found a 'national consensus' against capital punishment for a particular offense . . . when Congress, consisting of Representatives from all 50 States, has affirmatively authorized such punishment.") (quoting Acting SG's brief at 4).
Beyond this and other statements of respect for the military justice system, the brief engages in nuanced discussion of military law reflecting great familiarity with the system. In one passage sure to warm any military litigator's heart, Louisiana reminds the Supremes that their predecessors on the bench relied in part on the UCMJ when deciding Miranda. Id. at 7. The brief also knowledgeably discusses CMA and CMR decisions dealing with Coker's effect on the military justice system, id. at 17, and calls out Petitioner's counsel for ignoring a 1989 military capital prosecution for rape, id. at 14-15.
The brief's most devastating point is delivered even deeper in the weeds. Petitioner's brief opposing rehearing argued that neither of the DOD reports that led to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006's Article 120 amendments "mentions the penalty for child (or adult) rape in its executive summary." Petitioner's Brief at 9-10. But if one actually reads past the executive summary, Louisiana's brief points out, the Joint Service Committee's report on sex crimes and the UCMJ includes a discussion about Coker and its effect on capital punishment for rape generally and for child rape specifically. Louisiana's Supplemental Brief at 12 (citing JSC Report at 74-75). As a matter of advocacy, that point must have been particularly delicious for Louisiana's counsel, since Petitioner's counsel had lit them up for allegedly overplaying the Joint Service Committee report's treatment of the Louisiana statute authorizing capital punishment for child rape. Petitioner's Brief at 10. Yet, as Louisiana's counsel retort, page 75 of the JSC report expressly discussed the 1995 amendment to Louisiana law that allowed capital punishment for child rape. Louisiana's Supplemental Brief at 12.
What happens next? As the greatest blog on Earth (SCOTUSblog) reports: "The Justices are scheduled to consider the rehearing petition at their private Conference on Monday. If rehearing is granted, word of that may become known as early as next Tuesday. A denial might not become known until Monday, Oct. 6, at the formal opening of the new Term." We will, of course, be on the lookout for developments and post a link when more news is available.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Dossey explained
Yesterday we noted that the petition for grant of review challenging the Navy-Marine Corps Court's decision in United States v. Dossey, 66 M.J. 619 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2008), had been dismissed. Now we've learned why. Petty Officer Dossey is being administratively separated in lieu of court-martial.
Military judge denies government's reconsideration motion challenging Article 120 ruling
Back on 15 August, we discussed Judge Beal's ruling in a Navy court-martial holding that Article 120's burden-shifting provisions are unconstitutional. Today, Judge Beal issued an order denying the government's reconsideration request in the case, United States v. Fairley. We've posted that ruling here.
Civilian Court-Martial Appeal Challenging the Constitutionality of Art. 2(a)(10), UCMJ
Ask and ye shall receive. Here is the writ appeal petition filed on 18 Sep 08 by Mr. Ali challenging UCMJ jurisdiction in his case. See our prior coverage here. Mr. Ali is challenging jurisdiction on a number of fronts. Some are expected, that Congress exceeded its authority in amending Art. 2(a)(10) and permitting his court-martial, and others are not, arguing that because no implementing regulations are in place the Court does not have jurisdiction. I'll post more substantive analysis later. Enjoy!
Monday, September 22, 2008
So much news, so many unanswered questions
Today's update of CAAF's online Daily Journal included quite a bit of news. The No Man has already posted below about the biggest story -- a writ appeal filed in the case of a civilian accompanying the forces who was court-martialed in Iraq.
In other news:
1. Government rolls over on "attempted drunk on duty" case. We previously noted the grant in United States v. Snyder, No. 07-0765/NA, which involved a question that would have befuddled even Colonel Winthrop: "WHETHER THE SPECIFICATION UNDER THE ADDITIONAL CHARGE STATES AN OFFENSE FOR ATTEMPTED DRUNK ON DUTY IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 80, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (UCMJ)." Code 46 just made that case go away, conceding that the evidence wasn't legally sufficient to support the conviction. See United States v. Snyder, __ M.J. ___, No. 07-0765/NA (C.A.A.F. Sept. 18, 2008). CAAF accepted the concession, cancelled oral argument, set aside the finding of guilty to that offense and the sentence, and kicked the case back to NMCCA to either reassess the sentence or order a sentence rehearing. So some overeager Navy prosecutor, not happy with mere use and distribution of methamphetamine, had to tack on an attempted drunk on duty charge as well. The reward for that creativity is that two years and three months later, the case remains alive and will now surely kick around the appellate system for many more months until the adjudged bad-conduct discharge is finally executed.
2. Dossey appeal dismissed! I've been very critical of NMCCA's handling of the appeal in United States v. Dossey (and rightfully so). NMCCA first held 3-0 that it didn't have jurisdiction on an Article 62 appeal of a mistrial ruling. Then it reversed course and held 2-1 that it did. United States v. Dossey, 66 M.J. 619 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2008). Then, despite the panel's reversal of itself, departure from established NMCCA precedent, and divided opinion, NMCCA denied en banc reconsideration. United States v. Dossey, NMCCA No. 200700537 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. June 11, 2008) (en banc) (order). Worse yet, as we discussed here, it sought to justify its denial of en banc reconsideration by citing a Second Circuit opinion that actually indicated en banc rehearing was necessary because one of the court's judges disagreed with the panel opinion that departed from the court's precedent. But there was some hope to lessen the precedential value of NMCCA's dubious published opinion when a petition for grant of review was filed at CAAF on 12 June 2008. But on 17 September, CAAF granted the Government's motion to dismiss the petition, which also mooted out a defense motion to withdraw the petition. I have no idea what happened to result in the case's dismissal and I have yet to wring any info out of my sources. I'll fill you in when I find out.
3. Government writ appeal denied. We previous discussed Code 46's writ appeal seeking to force Judge Harty to enter a ruling on the record after he issued a ruling by e-mail. The Government wanted to appeal the underlying ruling. The need for extraordinary relief seemed to be substantially dulled, though, since the Government's separate Article 62 appeal was apparently timely filed even if measured from the date of the e-mailed ruling. NMCCA denied the Government's petition for extraordinary relief in a one-page order. Now CAAF has even more summarily denied the Government's writ appeal. United States v. Harty, __ M.J. ___, Misc. No. 08-8024/NA (C.A.A.F. Sept. 17, 2008).
4. A couple of grants. CAAF granted review of the following issue: "WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY PERMITTING THE CONVENING AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS PRETRIAL AGREEMENT WITH APPELLANT DESPITE APPELLANT BEGINNING PERFORMANCE OF PROMISES CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT." United States v. Dean, __ M.J. ___, No. 08-0431/AR (C.A.A.F. Sept. 19, 2008). As seems increasingly typical with Army cases, I can't find any electronic trace of the CCA opinion. The other grant is a specified issue in a Navy case: "WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE MILITARY JUDGE TO ADMIT AT SENTENCING A STIPULATION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT IN MILITARY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES WHERE THE EXPERT, WHO DID NOT PERSONALLY EVALUATE APPELLANT, OPINED GENERALLY ABOUT MINIMAL AND OPTIMAL TERMS OF CONFINEMENT FOR A PERSON DETECTED OF POSSESSING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY." United States v. Campos, __ M.J. ___, No. 08-0409/NA (C.A.A.F. Sept. 19, 2008). NMCCA's unpublished opinion in the case, which addressed the specified issue, is available here. United States v. Campos, No. NMCCA 200602523 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2008).
Did I miss anything of interest?
In other news:
1. Government rolls over on "attempted drunk on duty" case. We previously noted the grant in United States v. Snyder, No. 07-0765/NA, which involved a question that would have befuddled even Colonel Winthrop: "WHETHER THE SPECIFICATION UNDER THE ADDITIONAL CHARGE STATES AN OFFENSE FOR ATTEMPTED DRUNK ON DUTY IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 80, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (UCMJ)." Code 46 just made that case go away, conceding that the evidence wasn't legally sufficient to support the conviction. See United States v. Snyder, __ M.J. ___, No. 07-0765/NA (C.A.A.F. Sept. 18, 2008). CAAF accepted the concession, cancelled oral argument, set aside the finding of guilty to that offense and the sentence, and kicked the case back to NMCCA to either reassess the sentence or order a sentence rehearing. So some overeager Navy prosecutor, not happy with mere use and distribution of methamphetamine, had to tack on an attempted drunk on duty charge as well. The reward for that creativity is that two years and three months later, the case remains alive and will now surely kick around the appellate system for many more months until the adjudged bad-conduct discharge is finally executed.
2. Dossey appeal dismissed! I've been very critical of NMCCA's handling of the appeal in United States v. Dossey (and rightfully so). NMCCA first held 3-0 that it didn't have jurisdiction on an Article 62 appeal of a mistrial ruling. Then it reversed course and held 2-1 that it did. United States v. Dossey, 66 M.J. 619 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2008). Then, despite the panel's reversal of itself, departure from established NMCCA precedent, and divided opinion, NMCCA denied en banc reconsideration. United States v. Dossey, NMCCA No. 200700537 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. June 11, 2008) (en banc) (order). Worse yet, as we discussed here, it sought to justify its denial of en banc reconsideration by citing a Second Circuit opinion that actually indicated en banc rehearing was necessary because one of the court's judges disagreed with the panel opinion that departed from the court's precedent. But there was some hope to lessen the precedential value of NMCCA's dubious published opinion when a petition for grant of review was filed at CAAF on 12 June 2008. But on 17 September, CAAF granted the Government's motion to dismiss the petition, which also mooted out a defense motion to withdraw the petition. I have no idea what happened to result in the case's dismissal and I have yet to wring any info out of my sources. I'll fill you in when I find out.
3. Government writ appeal denied. We previous discussed Code 46's writ appeal seeking to force Judge Harty to enter a ruling on the record after he issued a ruling by e-mail. The Government wanted to appeal the underlying ruling. The need for extraordinary relief seemed to be substantially dulled, though, since the Government's separate Article 62 appeal was apparently timely filed even if measured from the date of the e-mailed ruling. NMCCA denied the Government's petition for extraordinary relief in a one-page order. Now CAAF has even more summarily denied the Government's writ appeal. United States v. Harty, __ M.J. ___, Misc. No. 08-8024/NA (C.A.A.F. Sept. 17, 2008).
4. A couple of grants. CAAF granted review of the following issue: "WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY PERMITTING THE CONVENING AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS PRETRIAL AGREEMENT WITH APPELLANT DESPITE APPELLANT BEGINNING PERFORMANCE OF PROMISES CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT." United States v. Dean, __ M.J. ___, No. 08-0431/AR (C.A.A.F. Sept. 19, 2008). As seems increasingly typical with Army cases, I can't find any electronic trace of the CCA opinion. The other grant is a specified issue in a Navy case: "WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE MILITARY JUDGE TO ADMIT AT SENTENCING A STIPULATION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT IN MILITARY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES WHERE THE EXPERT, WHO DID NOT PERSONALLY EVALUATE APPELLANT, OPINED GENERALLY ABOUT MINIMAL AND OPTIMAL TERMS OF CONFINEMENT FOR A PERSON DETECTED OF POSSESSING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY." United States v. Campos, __ M.J. ___, No. 08-0409/NA (C.A.A.F. Sept. 19, 2008). NMCCA's unpublished opinion in the case, which addressed the specified issue, is available here. United States v. Campos, No. NMCCA 200602523 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2008).
Did I miss anything of interest?
BREAKING NEWS: Writ from First Ever Amended Art. 2, UCMJ Civilian Court-Martial
It appears the former civilian contractor that pled guilty to UCMJ charges and received a sub-jurisdictional sentence, as covered on CAAFlog extensively, including here and here, has filed a writ appeal. From the September 18, 2008 Daily Journal:
Misc. No. 09-8001/AR. Mohammad Allaa ALI, Appellant v. Lieutenant General Floyd Austin, Convening Authority, the United States Army & the United States, Appellees. CCA 20080678. Notice is hereby given that a writ-appeal petition for review of the decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals on application for extraordinary relief was filed under Rule 27(b) on this date.Again, I think we scooped the world. Would be a greater scoop if we had the pleadings, anyone, throw me a bone here?
Sunday, September 21, 2008
CAAFlog turns two
No, we didn't record a double play in a military justice blog softball tournament. Tomorrow is the second anniversary of our first post.
♪ Happy birthday to us. Happy birthday to us . . . . ♪ (The Kabul Klipper, our resident musicologist, should feel free to insert the correct notes.)
♪ Happy birthday to us. Happy birthday to us . . . . ♪ (The Kabul Klipper, our resident musicologist, should feel free to insert the correct notes.)
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