(CAAFlog tip of the day: to convert from all caps to all lowercase paste the all caps message into Word, highlight the text, and press Shift-F3 until the text appears in all lowercase.)
I. Whether the lower court erred in holding that Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), does not apply to the consent search of appellant's marital home where agents from the Marine Corps' Criminal Investigation Division (CID) first received appellant's unequivocal objection to a search of his marital home and then obtained consent from appellant's wife, both of whom were physically located in separate interrogation rooms in CID’s building on Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii.
II. Whether, assuming arguendo that the search of appellant's marital home was unreasonable in light of Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), the lower court erred in holding that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule would allow admission of the seized evidence.
As CAAFlog previously predicted, here, this case was destined for CAAF review. This is the NMCCA panel reversal of an MJ's (now-Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary CJ MacKenzie's) decision that turned into an en banc affirmance when 2 NMCCA judges went from agreeing with a panel decision to agreeing with an en banc decision. As CAAFlog previously observed, this inevitable discovery and competing consent case provides no clue as to why or how the two judges changed their votes from the panel to the en banc opinion. Now CAAF takes a shot at explaining why they were right or wrong to change their votes.
UPDATE: From CAAFlog's dueling post on Weston: Yesterday was the last day that CAAF could grant review of a case and, without altering the normal briefing schedule, ensure that it will be ready for oral argument by the 25 and 26 February argument dates.